Defence Finance Monitor #144
Defence Finance Monitor applies a top–down method that traces how NATO, EU and allied strategic priorities are translated into regulations, funding lines and procurement programmes, and then into demand for specific capabilities, technologies and companies. We use official doctrine as the organising frame to identify where strategic relevance is being institutionally defined and where it is materialising in concrete budgets, acquisition pathways and industrial capacity.
Our working assumption is that what becomes structurally relevant in NATO/EU strategy tends, over time, to become relevant also from a financial and industrial point of view. In the European context, this includes the progressive operationalisation of strategic autonomy: the effort to reduce critical dependencies, secure supply chains, strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base, and align regulatory, financial and procurement instruments with long-term security objectives. On this basis, DFM operates as a decision-support tool: it benchmarks investment and industrial choices against institutional demand, clarifies which capabilities are rising on the spending agenda, and maps the funding instruments, eligibility constraints and supply-chain factors that shape real-world feasibility across investors, industry, public authorities and research organisations.
Defence Finance Monitor rests on a single analytical premise: within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, strategic doctrine precedes regulation and capability planning, regulation precedes budgets, and budgets shape markets.
European Security & Defence Industry
Europe’s Plan to Detect Hypersonic Missiles from Space
Hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles compress warning timelines and undermine traditional radar-based air and missile defence architectures by flying low, manoeuvring unpredictably, and exploiting line-of-sight constraints. For European planners, the problem is no longer theoretical: without persistent space-based infrared sensing capable of detecting launches and tracking high-speed glide trajectories in near real time, layered defence concepts risk entering the engagement cycle too late. This analysis examines Europe’s emerging response through EU and NATO-aligned programmes such as TWISTER, HYDIS and ODIN’s EYE, assessing whether the continent’s industrial base—focal plane arrays, cryogenic coolers, radiation-hardened processing and satellite integration—can deliver a sovereign hypersonic early-warning layer within the 2030 horizon. It maps the technical chokepoints, supply-chain concentration risks, and integration requirements that will determine whether Europe can translate political commitment into an operationally credible space-based tracking architecture.
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Critical Infrastructure & Corporate Readiness
Europe’s Defence Supply Risk in Tungsten and Titanium
Europe’s defence-industrial vulnerability in critical raw materials lies not primarily in mining, but in the concentration of refining and intermediate processing capacity outside the European Union. Tungsten and titanium—both formally recognised as strategic under the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act and identified by NATO as defence-critical—illustrate how dependence at the midstream stage can translate directly into capability risk. While European downstream industries manufacture munitions, aircraft and missile systems, they rely overwhelmingly on imported tungsten powders and titanium sponge, often sourced from highly concentrated global supply chains dominated by China and other non-EU producers. This analysis examines how processing chokepoints, long certification cycles, and limited domestic refining capacity create structural exposure for European defence programmes, and evaluates the policy, industrial and financial measures required to align raw-material resilience with rearmament and strategic autonomy objectives through 2030.
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Operational & Tactical Priorities
Persistent Undersea Awareness: ASW Sonar and Acoustic Networks as a Strategic Infrastructure Layer
The strategic vulnerability addressed by ASW sonar and acoustic networks is not the absence of individual sensors, but the absence of a persistent, integrated underwater detection architecture capable of converting acoustic signals into actionable command decisions across contested maritime regions. As NATO and the European Union increasingly frame seabed infrastructure, reinforcement routes, and maritime choke points as collective security priorities, underwater awareness shifts from a fleet-level tactical function to a structural requirement of deterrence and resilience. This analysis examines how distributed sonar systems, seabed sensors, uncrewed platforms, data fusion centres, and secure communications must operate as a coherent system-of-systems to close detection gaps, reduce attribution delay, and sustain track continuity under both high-intensity and grey-zone conditions. It situates acoustic networks within the broader institutional logic of “deter, detect, respond,” linking operational performance thresholds to industrial capacity, technological dependencies, and EU–NATO policy commitments on undersea infrastructure protection.
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Operational & Tactical Priorities
Advanced Electronic Warfare and Sensor Suites in European Defence
Advanced electronic warfare and sensor suites address a structural vulnerability in European defence: the inability to maintain persistent, resilient awareness and control of the electromagnetic spectrum under contested conditions. As adversaries employ jamming, spoofing, stealth technologies and massed autonomous systems, gaps in sensing and spectrum management translate directly into degraded detection, disrupted command links and reduced survivability of next-generation platforms. This analysis examines how integrated radar systems, electronic support measures, active jamming capabilities and AI-enabled signal processing must be embedded within NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence architecture and EU technological-edge priorities. It evaluates performance thresholds, interoperability requirements and industrial supply-chain constraints that will shape Europe’s ability to sustain electromagnetic-spectrum dominance between 2025 and 2035.
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Operational & Tactical Priorities
AI-Assisted Targeting and Command & Control in European Defence
AI-assisted targeting and command & control address a structural vulnerability in modern warfare: the inability of traditional, human-centric decision processes to keep pace with high-speed, high-density multi-domain conflict. In environments characterised by hypersonic threats, drone swarms, electronic warfare and cyber disruption, delays in data fusion and engagement sequencing translate directly into mission failure. This analysis examines how AI-enabled data processing, sensor fusion and automated decision support are being integrated into NATO’s digital backbone and EU defence initiatives to compress reaction times, preserve targeting accuracy and maintain operational tempo. It evaluates performance thresholds, architectural dependencies and industrial supply-chain risks that will determine whether Europe can field resilient, interoperable AI-C2 systems capable of sustaining decision superiority through 2035.
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Without a structured map of the linkages between doctrine, budget and capacity, strategy remains abstract, capital remains misallocated, and industrial readiness remains reactive rather than deliberate.

