Defence Finance Monitor #141
Defence Finance Monitor applies a top–down method that traces how NATO, EU and allied strategic priorities are translated into regulations, funding lines and procurement programmes, and then into demand for specific capabilities, technologies and companies. We use official doctrine as the organising frame to identify where strategic relevance is being institutionally defined and where it is materialising in concrete budgets, acquisition pathways and industrial capacity.
Our working assumption is that what becomes structurally relevant in NATO/EU strategy tends, over time, to become relevant also from a financial and industrial point of view. In the European context, this includes the progressive operationalisation of strategic autonomy: the effort to reduce critical dependencies, secure supply chains, strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base, and align regulatory, financial and procurement instruments with long-term security objectives. On this basis, DFM operates as a decision-support tool: it benchmarks investment and industrial choices against institutional demand, clarifies which capabilities are rising on the spending agenda, and maps the funding instruments, eligibility constraints and supply-chain factors that shape real-world feasibility across investors, industry, public authorities and research organisations.
Defence Finance Monitor rests on a single analytical premise: within the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, strategic doctrine precedes regulation and capability planning, regulation precedes budgets, and budgets shape markets.
Certification in Times of Crisis: Mutual Recognition under EDIP Article 69
The central question confronting European defence policy is whether administrative law can keep pace with high-intensity security dynamics. Modern conflicts evolve in compressed cycles, where technological adaptation and rapid deployment determine operational relevance. Yet certification regimes within the European Union have traditionally been nationally segmented, sequential, and procedurally dense. This structural mismatch between strategic urgency and administrative rhythm creates friction at precisely the moment when cohesion is most required. The European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), established by Regulation (EU) 2025/2643, seeks to address that tension through targeted crisis instruments. Among these, Article 69 introduces a mutual recognition mechanism designed to prevent certification bottlenecks during security-related supply crises. The provision does not attempt to permanently harmonise national systems. Instead, it activates a coordinated procedural alignment under defined emergency conditions. By temporarily transforming a national certification decision into a Union-wide administrative fact, Article 69 reframes certification as a collective security function. The analysis below examines how this mechanism operates, what it changes, and what it leaves structurally untouched.
Defence AI & Autonomous Systems
This analysis addresses the operational question behind “Defence AI & Autonomous Systems”: how to preserve decision advantage and generate scalable combat mass when data flows are disrupted, the spectrum is contested, and precision effects depend on rapid sensor-to-shooter loops. It situates AI and autonomy as a bridging layer between strategic ambition and measurable battlefield performance, focusing on the conditions under which automation improves situational awareness, targeting, logistics, and persistence rather than producing isolated “AI-enabled” applications. The report follows the policy anchoring across NATO and EU frameworks on technological edge, then translates it into operational requirements for data-centric C2, resilient connectivity, assurance regimes for deployment at scale, and industrial pathways capable of sustaining high-consumption, fast-iteration capabilities in the 2025–2035 planning horizon.
Space Domain Awareness Networks
This report examines the operational and institutional foundations of Space Domain Awareness Networks within the NATO and EU security architecture. It analyses how space is being integrated into deterrence, crisis management, and resilience planning, and it clarifies the concrete capability implications of that shift. The assessment moves from strategic anchoring to mission scenarios, command-and-control design, data governance, and industrial capacity, with particular attention to structural bottlenecks that may constrain scalability and readiness. The focus remains on how sensor architectures, digital infrastructures, cyber resilience, spectrum control, and supply-chain dependencies interact in shaping Europe’s ability to maintain a shared, decision-grade space picture under contested conditions.
Green Procurement & Supply-Chain Decarbonisation
This report assesses how green procurement and supply-chain decarbonisation intersect with deterrence, readiness, and industrial resilience in the Euro-Atlantic security framework. It examines how NATO and EU policy instruments link energy security, climate adaptation, and supply-chain reform to force generation and sustainment, and it analyses the operational consequences for reinforcement corridors, rear-area infrastructure, fuel logistics, and surge production capacity. The emphasis is on endurance under contested conditions, with attention to life-cycle energy demand, supplier qualification, infrastructure vulnerability, and the structural constraints that may affect the scalability and credibility of high-intensity defence planning over the coming decade.
Without a structured map of the linkages between doctrine, budget and capacity, strategy remains abstract, capital remains misallocated, and industrial readiness remains reactive rather than deliberate.