In December 2020 the Bundeswehr signed an eight-year framework contract for 120 mm tank ammunition under which up to 203,000 rounds could be procured. Of those rounds, 184,000 were practice ammunition and 19,000 were multi-purpose combat rounds, and the supplier published the breakdown in a one-page press release. In the years since, the ceilings of the Bundeswehr’s ammunition frameworks have risen from hundreds of millions of euros to several billion, France has raised its programmed ammunition spending and set out in law increases in deliveries by type of munition, the United Kingdom has committed billions of pounds to munitions, and parliaments have repeatedly been told that stocks are limited. What has not grown is the public detail on what the new rounds are for. A round fired on a range in peacetime and a round held in a depot for war can come from the same production line and the same contract, and in at least one country they are accounted for in the same stock. The share of new procurement that sustains training, as opposed to the share that rebuilds war reserves, decides whether higher spending deepens the stockpile or replaces what has been fired, how long production lines stay loaded and which products industry should prioritise. The question is what Europe’s public record discloses about that split, and what follows for those who plan, finance and supply ammunition production when it is not disclosed.