Europe’s effort to make space a dependable part of its defence architecture has reached a point at which the central problem is no longer whether institutions recognise the military importance of satellite communications, observation, navigation and orbital awareness. The harder question is whether a collection of Union programmes, national assets, intergovernmental projects and commercial systems can be converted into capabilities that governments can call upon with defined priority, security, availability and continuity in a crisis. The European Space Shield is the political expression of that objective, but a shield in the operational sense requires more than spacecraft, announced investment or industrial activity. It requires legal authority to aggregate demand, money that can actually be committed, contracting entities able to place orders, infrastructure and terminals that can be qualified, security accreditation, enforceable access rights and an operating model that survives the transition from development expenditure to accepted service. The question that follows is therefore practical: what can the Shield actually buy, under whose authority, with which money, and how far has each of its purchasing chains progressed?
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