Britain’s central debarment list has been capable of carrying names since 24 February 2025. At 10 September 2026 it carries none, having been approved with effect from 17 November 2025 and next due for review on 17 November 2026 — over a period in which £40.6 billion passed from the Ministry of Defence’s core department to UK and foreign-owned organisations, 45 per cent of it through non-competitive sourcing. For European defence suppliers, continued access to British military demand is therefore no longer adequately described by asking whether a company has been convicted, sanctioned or formally barred. The relevant question is narrower and more operational: whether a particular supplier, associated entity or subcontractor remains legally admissible for a particular procurement or contract after adverse facts have emerged, and whether remediation, entity separation, replacement or an exceptional continuity mechanism can prevent those facts from interrupting supply. This matters because defence production is organised through corporate groups and specialised supply chains whose legal boundaries do not coincide neatly with their technological ones. A problematic event may attach to one entity while a programme depends on another; a subcontractor may be legally replaceable but technically difficult to substitute; an investigation may create diligence risk without creating an exclusion ground; and a defence authority may possess continuity powers without acquiring a general right to disregard mandatory exclusion. The resulting regulatory problem lies at the intersection of legal eligibility and industrial readiness, but it is the legal mechanism that determines when one can be converted into the other. What an empty list proves is the unresolved question: whether it records an architecture that has not yet been used, or one that operates almost entirely below the level at which it becomes public.