Europe can now see more of what happens above its submarine cables, electricity interconnectors and pipelines than at any point in the past. Navies, coastguards, network operators and intelligence services can identify vessels of interest, reconstruct anomalous tracks and match them against the timing of a fault. Seeing a threat, however, is not the same as being entitled to stop it. A coastal state does not acquire general police powers over a foreign merchant ship merely because the ship is in its exclusive economic zone, because the infrastructure beneath it is economically critical, or because its behaviour looks suspicious. What a state may lawfully do depends on where the vessel is, which flag it flies or fails to fly, what conduct is suspected, which domestic authority holds the relevant power and which rule of international law permits action against a foreign ship. The incidents in the Baltic Sea since late 2024 have shown how far apart these stages can be: detecting a vessel, stopping it, holding it and sustaining criminal jurisdiction afterwards each require a different legal basis. The question for European governments, operators and investors is therefore precise. Which authorities may act against a suspect vessel, at which stage and in which maritime zone, and where does the chain from awareness to enforceable action still break?
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