Armies that intend to move heavy equipment across Europe at speed depend on the railway, and the railway depends on rolling stock that armed forces rarely own. In March 2026 the European Defence Agency reported that no member state of the European Union owns enough wagons for a movement scenario and that, because locomotives are generally not owned either, governments rely on commercial contracts. That dependence turns a logistical question into a procurement question. A defence ministry can pay an operator to keep wagons, locomotives, crews and train paths available whether or not they are used; it can pay only for the transports it actually orders and accept whatever the operator can supply at the moment of need; or it can buy or rent wagons in its own name and take on the maintenance and regulatory obligations that come with them. Each choice places the risk that wagons will not be there when they are needed in a different set of hands, at a different price and with different consequences for budgets, suppliers and readiness. Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have made different choices, and Germany has changed course more than once since 2018. The question is where the risk of wagon availability sits when European defence ministries buy military rail capacity, and how these three countries have moved that risk between the end of 2018 and the autumn of 2026.