NATO–EU Strategic Priority: Maritime Security & Undersea Infrastructure Protection
Maritime security and the protection of undersea infrastructure have become central tests of how resilient European and allied democracies really are. Gas pipelines on the seabed, fibre-optic cables carrying almost all international data, and the dense clusters of offshore platforms and wind farms form an invisible but essential layer of the European security and economic system. The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines and subsequent cable incidents in the Baltic and North Sea have shown that these assets are no longer exposed only to accidents or natural risks, but to deliberate, covert hostile action. At the same time, Russian submarine and “research” activities close to critical routes, the rapid spread of unmanned underwater vehicles and the integration of cyber operations with physical sabotage have widened the spectrum of possible threats. For NATO, the EU and national governments, this means that sea control can no longer be understood only in terms of ships and fleets, but must include the ability to monitor, defend and if necessary rapidly repair vital infrastructure on and under the seabed. The question is whether allied institutions, industries and research systems are adapting fast enough to give credible protection to these assets and to remove the incentives for hybrid attacks in the maritime domain.
The report available to subscribers examines this question along a complete political–strategic and techno-industrial chain. It opens by reconstructing why “Maritime Security & Undersea Infrastructure Protection” has been elevated to a formal strategic priority, linking it to NATO’s Strategic Concept, the Alliance Maritime Strategy, the EU Maritime Security Strategy and recent national reviews. It then translates this into the operational dimension, explaining how maritime domain awareness, anti-submarine warfare, naval task group integration and undersea infrastructure surveillance are being reorganised in a multidomain architecture that combines ships, submarines, aircraft, satellites, cyber and unmanned systems. A central section derives the concrete tactical and capability requirements, from UUV/UAV surveillance, sonar networks and seabed sensors to maritime patrol aircraft and repair capacity, showing where current shortfalls lie. The following chapter analyses how NATO, the EU and national authorities are using regulations, funding programmes and procurement plans to implement this priority and shape industrial behaviour. A dedicated section maps the structural bottlenecks and strategic dependencies that still constrain allied freedom of action, including supply-chain vulnerabilities and production limits. The report closes by outlining what this means for companies, technologies, research actors and investors, indicating which segments of the defence–technology–capital ecosystem are becoming central and where medium- to long-term opportunities and risks are emerging.