European armies are buying new main battle tanks again, and in significant numbers. Governments also want shorter delivery times and more control over how the fleets are sustained. Increasingly, the purchase is expected to bring industrial work home: a national assembly hall, a domestic repair centre, a share of hulls or electronics for local companies. Three routes now serve that demand. The first is the German Leopard 2A8, bought by a widening group of European states. The second is the Korean K2, which Poland is buying in large numbers and partly building under licence. The third is the Rheinmetall Panther, still in development in Hungary and being industrialised in Italy. Each route spreads some work across Europe. None of them, by itself, shows whether that work can be replaced if a supplier, a licence or a production line becomes unavailable. A tank assembled in Norway, Lithuania or Poland may bring real readiness benefits without creating a second source for its gun, engine, transmission or active protection, or for the authority to change its design. Conversely, depending on a foreign design authority does not make local production irrelevant if it shortens repair times, builds a qualified workforce and lets a damaged or ageing fleet be sustained at home. The question that matters for European strategic autonomy is therefore narrower than whether tanks are “European” or “national”. It asks which rights and capabilities the current orders actually transfer, and whether the wider geography of production is creating capacity that could substitute for the concentrated parts of the supply chain.
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