A French listed investment company took majority control of a Belgian radar group whose registered vehicle now carries €45,902,472 of subscribed capital, whose consolidated turnover is reported at €83.9 million, and whose three principal Belgian operating entities together file €67.294 million of statutory revenue and 266.8 full-time equivalents against a group figure of 400 collaborators. Those three numbers are the whole problem in miniature. The capital sits in a holding company that filed a 2025 loss of €2,756,212 and employs nobody; the turnover is management-reported and unsegmented; the workforce gap is real but not evidence of inconsistency. Around them lies a group that measures other manufacturers’ radars, builds radio-frequency electronics in Flanders, holds granted antenna and signal-processing patents, and has signed one collaboration agreement, one memorandum of understanding, one letter of intent and one production memorandum in the fifteen months following the transaction. The structural constraint is that none of those instruments allocates work, and the measurement capability that gives the group its distinctive position is documented by the company rather than by a customer. The unresolved question is therefore not whether Intersoft Electronics has capability, capital or partners. It is whether anything in the public record shows a European defence customer buying that capability repeatedly enough, and with enough allocated authority, to constitute a platform.
This report proceeds in six passes. The first tests the meaning of platform against the ownership and financing architecture, working from IDI’s transaction announcement and portfolio disclosure, its universal registration document, Belgian company-registry records for IE Holding and the operating companies, the Cooperation Agreement of 30 November 2022 that governs Belgian investment screening, the Belgian Competition Authority’s merger thresholds and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2025/1099. The second examines the economic perimeter, the workforce and the Oostkamp plant, using National Bank of Belgium filings as indexed by the company registry, the group’s own manufacturing and certification material and the Flemish innovation award. The third examines radar metrology and the evidence for repeatable lifecycle support. The fourth examines naval identification friend or foe and the boundary of design authority, working from Saab’s F123 announcement, German programme reporting and Intersoft’s own L-IESA material. The fifth examines the conversion pipeline, the European Defence Fund award decision and the dependencies that partnerships introduce. The sixth assesses what all of it means for European rearmament. The report does not value the company, does not estimate its leverage, and does not assert a contractual relationship that no opened document names.