When a port quay, a power interconnector or a gas pipeline on which armed forces rely is damaged, two financial questions arise at different times. The first is who pays the contractors, suppliers and vessels that put the asset back into service, often within weeks or months. The second is who ends up bearing the cost once insurers, courts and public authorities have done what they will do, which can take years. The two questions are routinely merged, as though an asset that is insured, publicly owned or funded for military mobility were thereby covered for its restoration. The Baltic Sea offers a rare set of documented cases in which the answers can be observed separately: an electricity interconnector repaired while its owners’ damages claims were still unresolved, a gas pipeline whose owners received insurance compensation, one of them in two instalments, and a new dual-use quay financed partly by the European Union and partly by its operator’s balance sheet. An English judgment on the Nord Stream pipelines adds a contrasting case, in which the property-damage and terrorism cover did not respond because of a war exclusion. Taken together, these cases raise a question that matters for Europe’s rearmament as much as for infrastructure finance: when defence-relevant civilian infrastructure is damaged, what pays for its restoration before the loss is allocated, and who carries what remains afterwards?