A radome looks like a secondary structure. It is a dielectric enclosure placed in front of an antenna to protect it from weather, aerodynamic loading, impact and handling, while letting electromagnetic energy pass with acceptable loss and distortion. For European defence capability the relevant industrial object is not the shell alone. It is the controlled chain that links material properties, structural design, repeatable manufacture, non-destructive inspection, electromagnetic measurement, environmental verification, integration, acceptance and repair. That chain matters because a change of material, coating, manufacturing process, inspection method or production site can alter the evidence on which an accepted radar installation rests. Counting the companies able to mould a composite dome therefore says little about whether a radar programme could absorb a supplier failure, a surge in demand or a design change. The question that matters for rearmament is different and harder: whether Europe can reproduce and sustain accepted radome performance, modify the product when the radar behind it changes, and substitute industrial inputs without losing control of the data, facilities, rights and qualification evidence needed to return the resulting configuration to an accepted state.