European Supply Chain Resilience in Defence: Reducing Transatlantic Dependency Without Decoupling
Operational risks, industrial constraints, and procurement strategies shaping Europe’s transition from structural dependency to managed autonomy within the transatlantic framework
European defence is entering a phase in which supply chain resilience has become a determinant of operational credibility rather than a secondary industrial consideration. The convergence of high-intensity conflict in Europe, simultaneous demand pressures on United States military production, and a strategic reorientation in Washington toward burden-shifting has exposed a structural vulnerability embedded across European force design, procurement patterns, and industrial capacity. Dependency is no longer an abstract political issue but a measurable operational constraint: European forces rely on US-origin platforms, munitions, intelligence, and command structures in ways that can be directly affected by US allocation decisions, export controls, and competing theatre priorities. The Iran conflict has demonstrated that US consumption of high-end munitions and interceptors can immediately reduce availability for European contingencies, while the evolving US National Defense Strategy signals a reduced default role in European defence. In this context, the central question is not whether Europe can replace transatlantic interdependence, but how it can reduce the most critical dependencies without undermining interoperability, alliance cohesion, and cost efficiency.
This report addresses the problem through a structured analytical framework that moves from diagnosis to policy implications. It first defines the nature of European dependency on US defence supply chains and situates it within recent strategic and industrial developments. It then disaggregates dependency into four operational categories—platform, munitions, intelligence, and command—to identify distinct risk mechanisms. The analysis proceeds with two empirical case studies: the Nordic-Baltic model, as a template for diversified and coordinated procurement, and Germany’s recent industrial and procurement pivot as a large-scale attempt at supply chain reorientation. The report then examines the political economy tension between European autonomy and US industrial and strategic expectations, before identifying the most critical supply chain chokepoints where dependency is hardest to reduce. It concludes with an assessment of the European Defence Industry Programme as the primary policy response and provides targeted recommendations for procurement authorities and investors, alongside specific analytical signals relevant for monitoring the evolution of European defence supply chain resilience in 2026–2027.