European Space Sovereignty and Resilient PNT
Galileo PRS, IRIS² and Europe’s funded space-industrial stack
Europe’s space-sovereignty problem is no longer confined to satellite ownership or launch access. It is now a question of operational continuity under denial: whether European governments, armed forces and critical-infrastructure operators can retain trusted positioning, navigation, timing and secure communications when GNSS signals are jammed, spoofed, degraded or politically unavailable. Galileo PRS, alternative PNT, GOVSATCOM, IRIS², EU SST and the emerging European Space Shield therefore need to be assessed as a single resilience architecture, not as isolated programmes. The financial question is equally central: which parts of this architecture are already legally grounded, contracted, funded and industrially executable, and which remain exposed to timing, procurement and capability risk.
The report is structured in four sections. The first establishes the legal and strategic architecture of European space sovereignty, distinguishing binding EU law from policy roadmaps, contracts and proposals. The second analyses Galileo PRS, NAVWAR and resilient PNT in GNSS-denied environments, with particular attention to access control, receiver integration, alternative navigation layers and defence funding. The third examines IRIS², GOVSATCOM, EU SST and the European Space Shield as the secure-connectivity and orbital-resilience layer of the European stack. The fourth maps the funded industrial base through Aerospacelab, Vyoma and D-Orbit, assessing what each company contributes to sovereign capability, where public finance validates the market signal, and where capability claims still require evidence.