Europe’s airborne early warning problem is no longer reducible to a competition between Boeing’s E-7 Wedgetail and Saab’s GlobalEye. The more consequential question is how European states and NATO can convert aircraft procurement into an enduring surveillance and battle-management capability while the existing E-3 fleets approach the end of their supportable lives. The aircraft is only one element of that conversion. Availability depends on financing, production capacity, configuration control, certification, training, maintenance, technical data, communications accreditation, software, secure interfaces and the legal right to use and modify what has been purchased. The emerging European choices therefore differ in kind as well as in platform: NATO is attempting another collectively owned fleet after abandoning its first E-7 route; the United Kingdom is building a very small sovereign E-7 force around an established US design; Sweden is accelerating GlobalEye introduction while accepting a staged configuration; France is buying an initial pair with options while replacing a larger E-3F fleet; and the Netherlands is testing whether access to a pooled Swedish capability can precede delivery of its own aircraft. These arrangements raise a question that announced or delivered aircraft numbers cannot answer: how much accepted, supportable and politically usable airborne command-and-control capacity each of them will generate, and on what terms.
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