Germany and Sweden have both given new weight to forces whose task is to hold national territory rather than to deploy beyond it. Germany has gathered its homeland protection forces into an Army division built largely from reservists; Sweden has written its existing Home Guard into a wartime organisation approved by parliament and set a higher personnel objective for it. Both moves are easy to describe in organisational terms, with a number of regiments or battalions, a chain of command and a list of tasks. They are much harder to describe in terms of materiel. A territorial force that guards ports, railway lines, bridges and energy installations needs vehicles, communications, sensors and night-vision equipment, and those items have to be authorised, budgeted, ordered and delivered before they exist in the units. For investors, suppliers, budget officials and parliamentarians, the practical question is therefore not whether territorial defence has become a priority, but whether the public record allows anyone outside the ministries to follow the money and the equipment from political intent to delivered materiel. The answer matters because European rearmament is being financed through annual budgets and, in Germany’s case, a special fund, and these instruments differ in how much they disclose; a force that is visible as an organisation but invisible as a line of expenditure is difficult to scrutinise, to plan for industrially, or to compare across countries. The question addressed here is how far the public record in Germany and Sweden documents the equipping of territorial defence forces, as distinct from their organisation and strength.