Diverging Threat Perceptions and the Global Defense Industry: Strategic Signaling and Asymmetric Rearmament After the U.S. Strike on Iran
Executive Summary
This report focuses on a specific aspect of the June 21, 2025, U.S. strike on Iranian nuclear facilities: the heightened perception of insecurity among major authoritarian powers. Rather than evaluating the legitimacy or stability-inducing potential of the operation, the analysis aims to examine how states such as North Korea, China, and Russia could interpret the strike in light of their own strategic vulnerabilities. In each case, the strike might be viewed not as an isolated event, but as part of a broader pattern of American deterrence behavior—capable of bypassing multilateral constraints to enforce red lines through high-precision, preemptive military action.
These interpretations could amplify internal debates within authoritarian regimes over the adequacy of existing deterrence architectures. For North Korea, the strike may reinforce the urgency of survivable nuclear platforms. For China, it could highlight the need to accelerate anti-access and counter-stealth systems. For Russia, it might serve as further validation of its narrative on Western coercive power and a reason to consolidate military influence near contested borders. Meanwhile, in the European Union, the operation may revive discussion on strategic dependency and defense autonomy. More broadly, the strike could contribute to a security environment where power projection and resilience—not formal treaties—shape national survival strategies and guide global rearmament trajectories.
