A land force that can be seen can be targeted, and an observer may look for it not only in visible light but in the infrared, thermal and radar bands as well. Concealment, signature management and decoys are the means by which armies try to deny or distort that picture, and they matter most when observation is persistent. Yet buying camouflage nets or inflatable decoys is not the same as possessing a capability. A capability requires someone to state the requirement, someone to measure signatures, a method of testing, a decision that a product is fit for military use, contracts that bind suppliers, deliveries that are accepted, troops who know how to use what arrives and a supply base able to replace it. For European governments, investors and suppliers, the practical question is where along that chain the public evidence actually reaches. How far does the public record show European land forces converting camouflage, signature management and decoys from research projects, tests and individual purchases into a capability that is specified, tested, contracted, qualified, accepted and sustained, and where does that record stop?