On 13 July 2026 the European Commission published guidelines under Article 13(5) of the Critical Entities Resilience Directive which state that backup power systems should be periodically tested, that power fuel autonomy should be maintained for at least 72 hours and that vendor contracts should be activated for emergency support covering supply, interventions and repairs. The guidelines are not legally binding, and they do not say what a port terminal must still be able to do when its grid supply fails. That gap matters because a terminal does not keep working simply because it owns a generator, a battery or a microgrid. Continuity depends on converting an alternative source of power into a coordinated sequence of functions: a safe shutdown, the survival of the information and control systems needed for recovery, the authorised restart of selected equipment, the re-forming of at least part of the logistic chain, and measurable output sustained for a defined period. Each step depends on technical integration, organisation, contracts, recurring finance and acceptance testing, and each can fail while the energy assets remain installed. European rearmament gives the question practical weight, because NATO’s resilience baseline requirements of September 2026 ask Allies to have arrangements in place for the continuity of essential civil transport services and civil support to the military. What must be demonstrated before backup power at a European cargo terminal can be counted as minimum cargo-handling capacity?