A tank renewal programme changes the equipment that an army must support before it necessarily changes the organisation providing that support. Recovery is a particularly consequential part of that relationship, because an immobilised vehicle may retain much of its military and economic value while that value cannot be restored by a workshop that cannot receive it. The requirement is therefore more precise than owning a fleet of recovery vehicles: an army needs equipment, personnel and support arrangements able to recover the particular combat vehicles it is introducing, while continuing to serve the vehicles they replace. The scale at which this operates is uneven and rarely stated together. Defence Equipment & Support carries the British tank conversion at a contract of £800 million placed with Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land, supporting around 650 jobs; Forsvarsmateriell’s acquisition announcements put the Norwegian recovery fleet, on completion, at nine vehicles procured under contracts of approximately NOK 400 million and €29 million; and the single largest disclosed British recovery-subsystem requirement of the period is estimated at £6,877,880 excluding VAT. The constraint that binds them is not budgetary but configurational: a recovery capability is only as available as the accepted pairing of vehicle, mission equipment, trained crew and supportable subsystem allows. What the public record does not settle is whether that pairing has been established for the configurations now entering service.