Three European air navigation service providers brought airspace-reservation services into operation within five weeks of one another, the last two on the same day, one day before the European deadline for the relevant System Wide Information Management functions. Measured against the money that produced them, the sums are modest: the Lithuanian provider records €1,503,369 as the Union-funded portion of its own activities inside the relevant work package, against €4,582,128.98 and €3,061,000 for two other Union projects the same operator runs in the same period. Measured against the national air-traffic environments into which those services must fit, they are smaller still: the Spanish authorisation covering support for the systems that underpin national air-traffic management runs to €28,794,645 for an initial thirty-six months, excluding taxes, and to €47,991,076 if both one-year extensions are exercised. Yet on the same programme record only one of the bilateral interfaces among the three states concerned was operational at closure, and in Sweden the admission of a foreign combat aircraft is a decision reserved to the Government rather than to the armed forces. European airpower is useful only to the extent that aircraft can reach, enter and use the airspace required for training and movement at the time and under the conditions the activity demands. The question this raises is not whether airspace management has been digitalised. It is whether the chain between an intended military activity and an executable flight has become predictable enough, at every link, to make the airpower available in practice.